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THE SPEECH ACT DEFENDS THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A VISIBLE AND 
TARGETED RESPONSE TO LIBEL TOURISM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Libel tourism is the name given to the practice of obstructing the First Amendment by 
suing American authors and publishers for defamation in foreign courts where a lower legal 
standard allows for easier recovery.
1
 The countries that libel plaintiffs seek out have laws that 
disfavor speech critical of public figures, and the countries often have a tenuous connection to 
the allegedly defamatory statements that gave rise to the suit.
2
 This new trend has ultimately 
undermined the Constitution’s First Amendment principles of free speech and free press by 
providing a “legal loophole.”3 Moreover, due to the rise of technological advances and Internet 
accessibility worldwide, a published document has the potential to appear in any jurisdiction in 
the world. As a result, a libel plaintiff may have the option of initiating litigation in any 
jurisdiction they may choose, albeit the publication occurred in the United States.
4
 In addition, 
under the doctrines of reciprocity and comity, the United States courts can enforce these foreign 
judgments so long as a court that recognizes and enforces United States judgments rendered the 
decision. All these circumstances taken together effectively allow the foreign libel plaintiff to 
bypass the protections afforded by the First Amendment.
5
  
                                                          
1 Libel Tourism: Hearing on H.R. 6146 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 9-10 n. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing]; Historical Libel Tourism Bill Becomes 
Law, available at http://www.bakerlaw.com/news/historic-libel-tourism-bill-becomes-law-08-10-2010/.  
2
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 1.  
3 The “legal loophole” refers to the practice of libel plaintiffs who strategically seek out foreign countries that have a 
lower legal standard than provided by the United States First Amendment even though a United States court would 
be a more appropriate forum. Tara Sturtevant, Can the United States Talk the Talk & Walk the Walk When it Comes 
to Libel Tourism: How the Freedom to sue Abroad can Kill the Freedom of Speech at Home, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 
269, 269 (2010). 
4
 Publication is defined as “the communication of the allegedly defamatory material to a third person.”  It can be 
accomplished through many means, for example, it can be “written, oral, broadcast, printed, photographic, etc.” 
MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 337 (7th ed. 2005). 
5
 See discussion of reciprocity and comity infra Part IV. 
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 The differences in U.S. and U.K. libel law were once a topic reserved for academic 
journals and law school classrooms. However a case in 1996 caused the two countries’ divide 
over libel law jurisprudence to be brought to the forefront.
6
 Controversial English historian 
David Irving sued Deborah Lipstadt, a professor from Emory University, in London for 
defamation after she correctly called him a “Holocaust denier.”7 The Irving-Lipstadt case was 
international news, bringing the significant divide between U.S. and U.K. defamation law to the 
forefront.
8
 Ms. Lipstadt assumed the litigation would be a “‘classic nuisance suit’” but after 5 
years, a ten day trial and costs of more than $3 million she escaped liability.
9
  
 Soon after the Irving-Lipstadt case, a case arose that “opened a new phase in the 
transatlantic free speech rift,” a lawsuit brought in England by a non-U.K. resident to capitalize 
on the country’s plaintiff-friendly libel laws.10 In 1997, Boris Berezovsky, a Russian tycoon, 
filed suit in London against Forbes magazine over an article titled “Godfather of the Kremlin?” 
written by Russian-American journalist Paul Kiebnikov.
11
 Forbes argued that it made little sense 
to litigate a case in England, involving a Russian plaintiff and a New York magazine, when only 
a fraction of the article’s readers were located there.12 Nevertheless, the British courts refused to 
                                                          
6
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
7
 Id.  
8
 Id. 
9
 Id.; Sarah Lyall, Where Suing for Libel is a National Specialty; Britain’s Plaintiff-Friendly Laws Have Become a 
Magnet for Litigators, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/22/arts/where-suing-for-libel-
national-specialty-britain-s-plaintiff-friendly-laws-have.html. 
10 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
11
 Paul Klebnikov, “Godfather of the Kremlin?” FORBES. Dec. 30, 1996 available at 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1996/1230/5815090a.html.  
12
 Berezovsky v. Forbes, Inc. (House of Lords), [2000] 1. W.L.R. 1004, 1008-09 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldjudgmt/jd000511/bere-1.htm.  
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“loosen their grips”13 on the suit and Forbes eventually withdrew their claims and settled the 
case rather than face trial.
14
 
 Following the rise in Internet publishing that weakened traditional notions of 
jurisdictional lines across the globe, politicians and billionaires “soon flocked – virtually, at least 
– to England to settle their scores where they knew the deck was stacked in their favor.”15 The 
leading case to highlight the phenomenon of libel tourism, which subsequently prompted state 
and federal legislation,
16
 was Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz.
17
 In 2004, Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz, libel 
tourism’s most notorious “frequent flier,” 18  filed a defamation lawsuit against Dr. Rachel 
Ehrenfeld in an English court in response to being named a potential terrorism financier in Dr. 
Ehrenfeld’s book Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It.19 Mahfouz 
obtained a default libel judgment against her enjoining further publication of the statements 
about Mahfouz in England and Wales.
20
 Subsequently, Dr. Ehrenfeld sought a declaratory 
judgment against Mahfouz in the District Court for the Southern District of New York in which 
she argued that the foreign judgment was unenforceable and repugnant to her First Amendment 
rights.
21
 The district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over Mahfouz.
22
 
In a certified question to the Court of Appeals of New York, Dr. Ehrenfeld claimed that absent a 
U.S. court ruling regarding her rights, the foreign judgment would have the practical effect of 
                                                          
13
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 26 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
14
 Editor’s Note, “Berezovsky versus Forbes,” Forbes.com, March 6, 2003, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1996/1230/5815090a_print.html.  
15
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
16
 See discussion of New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act and the SPEECH Act infra Part V. 
17
 Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008); Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.), 
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2005/1156.html.  
18
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 20 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
19
 Id.; Ehrenfeld, 518 F.3d at 103-04. 
20
 Ehrenfeld, 518 F.3d at 103-04. 
21
 Id. at 104. 
22 Id. 
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chilling her protected speech rights in the United States.
23
 On December 20, 2007, the Court of 
Appeals of New York held that Mahfouz’s contacts with the state of New York did not constitute 
a transaction of business in the state and thus New York’s long arm statute24 did not confer 
personal jurisdiction over him.
25
 Because a U.S. court cannot adjudicate a case without personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant, the case had to be dismissed.
26
  
 While Dr. Ehrenfeld’s case has generated a great deal of media attention, her case is not 
exceptional. Throughout the world journalists are increasingly finding themselves defending 
against libel suits, particularly in the United Kingdom, where the libel laws are stricter than those 
in their own country.
27
 Moreover, foreign courts readily affirm jurisdiction over them if the 
material they publish is viewed in those countries, thereby eviscerating American journalists’ 
reliance on First Amendment protections.
28
  
 The widespread use of the Internet expands this problem. Material posted on the Internet 
can be accessed in any country. As a result, “the actions of unrelated third parties – readers of 
articles online, online book purchasers – substantiate jurisdiction in foreign defamation 
disputes.”29  Because they are virtually being exposed to suit in any jurisdiction, American 
journalists must undertake the daunting task of anticipating all the laws they may be subject to by 
virtue of the fact that their material may land in a foreign jurisdiction. In effect, this nearly 
                                                          
23 Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. 2007). 
24
 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (a)(1) (“[A]s to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a 
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or 
through an agent: transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the 
state.”) 
25
 Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 831. 
26
 See discussion of personal jurisdiction infra Part II B 1. 
27
 David Kohler, Forty Years After New York Times v. Sullivan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REV. 
1203, 1204-05 (2004). 
28
 See discussion of personal jurisdiction, particularly in the UK infra Part II B 1. 
29
 Heather Maly, Publish at Your Own Risk or Don’t Publish at All: Forum Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation 
Leave the First Amendment Un-Guaranteed, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 883, 885 (2006). 
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impossible task has the result of chilling free speech for those who do not want to face litigation 
in foreign jurisdictions.  
 In order to remedy this problem and effectively preserve First Amendment principles, 
Congress enacted the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional 
Heritage Act (the “SPEECH Act”). This Note will examine this federal response, and its effect 
on libel tourism. Part I of this Note briefly examines the history and principles behind the First 
Amendment in the United States.  Part II articulates the different laws and policies that attract 
libel tourists to England and other countries. In particular, Part II compares the libel laws of the 
United States with popular libel plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions, specifically England and 
Australia. Part II also compares certain civil procedure principles within the United States and 
England. Part III discusses the prevalence of libel tourism through relevant case law and 
illustrations. In addition, Part III examines the chilling effects of libel tourism on First 
Amendment principles and Part IV discusses policy considerations and enforcement mechanisms 
in the United States. Part V discusses state and federal responses to libel tourism, in particular 
the New York Libel Terrorism Protection Act and the federal SPEECH Act. Finally, Part VI 
analyzes what impact, if any, the SPEECH Act will have on libel tourism. Specifically, Part VI 
examines the policy and procedural perspectives of the legislation, concluding that the SPEECH 
Act is constitutionally the furthest the United States can reach to protect American citizens from 
foreign defamation judgments.  
 
 
 
 
Marissa Gerny 
Legislative Journal Spring 2011 
 
6 
 
I.  FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY AND DEFAMATION LAW 
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech, or of the press.” 30  This constitutional protection holds a “near sacred place in 
American society” 31  and “was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the 
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”32 Freedom of expression is 
an indispensible means to the discovery of truth and a democratic self-government, in which “the 
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people.”33 It is embedded in our legal system to promote 
the expression and dissemination of ideas without the fear of persecution by the government.
34
 
The language of the First Amendment could be misread to suggest that the rights 
protected are absolute; however this would be a great over-generalization. The tort of defamation 
provides restrictions on what can be spoken and printed.
35
 On the other hand, American free 
speech jurisprudence is rooted in the “fourth estate” principle which reflects the notion that the 
press imposes an essential check on the powers of the government by keeping the public 
informed, and therefore it must receive the utmost protection in its ability to report the news 
without restraint.
36
 In the landmark case New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the First Amendment represents “a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it 
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government 
                                                          
30 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
31 Maly, supra note 29, at 889.  
32 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).  
33
 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
34
 Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 272. 
35
 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander 118 (defamation is a false publication that causes injury to a person’s reputation, 
or exposing him to contempt, public hatred, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or which affects him adversely in his trade 
or business); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts 568 (1977) (“Libel consists of the publication of defamatory 
matter by written or printed words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form of communication that 
has the potentially harmful qualities characteristic of written or printed words.”). 
36 Sarah Staveley-O’Carroll, Libel Tourism Laws: Spoiling the Holiday and Saving the First Amendment?, 4 N.Y.U. 
J. L. & LIBERTY 252, 255-56 (2010). 
Marissa Gerny 
Legislative Journal Spring 2011 
 
7 
 
and public officials.”37 The Court noted that the press protections demanded by the Constitution 
were an intentional departure from the British form of government.
38
  In order to give the press 
the “breathing space” essential to reporting on issues of public concern, the Court conceded that 
the “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate” and thus placed strict limitations on libel 
suits.
39
 The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the disputed statement was false, and if the 
plaintiff is a public official, he must prove that the statement was made with “actual malice,” 
which means the defendant had knowledge that the statement was false, or displayed a reckless 
disregard for the statement’s truth or falsity.40 The Constitution demands that the plaintiff must 
display this high level of fault with “convincing clarity.”41 Underlying the Court’s decision was 
the fear that any other standard would deter “would-be critics of official conduct . . . from 
voicing their criticism . . . because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the 
expense of having to do so.”42  
 Subsequent case law expanded the holding of New York Times as the Court continued to 
provide heightened speech protections. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts the Court held that the 
principles articulated in New York Times were also applicable to defamatory statements 
criticizing “public figures.”43 Although the Court declined to extend the actual malice standard of 
New York Times to defamation of individual persons who were neither public officials nor public 
                                                          
37
 This case concerned an advertisement in the New York Times on behalf of several individuals and groups 
protesting a “wave of terror” against blacks involved in non-violent demonstrations in the South. Plaintiff, one of 
three elected commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, was in charge of the police department. He filed 
a libel action against the newspaper and four black ministers whose names appeared in the ad, claiming that the 
allegations against the Montgomery police defamed him personally. It was uncontroverted that there were some 
inaccuracies in the two allegedly libelous paragraphs. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256-58, 270 
(1964).  
38 Id. at 274. 
39 Id. at 271. 
40
 Id. at 279-80. 
41 Id. at 285-86. 
42 Id. at 279. 
43
 Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967); see also Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding that 
private figures who report on matters of public concern are not necessarily subject to the actual malice standard, but 
must be subject to some standard of fault, negligence being the minimum). 
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figures, the Court nevertheless rejected the English law of strict liability and required a private 
plaintiff to show some degree of fault, negligence being the minimum.
44
 As a result, a plaintiff 
who is a public official or figure has a much greater obstacle to overcome in satisfying the 
constitutional requirements.  
II.  WHAT FEATURES ATTRACT LIBEL TOURISTS ABROAD? 
 London is often referred to as the “libel capital of the world”45 and has become the most 
attractive destination for libel tourists across the globe.
46
 While England has a very respectable 
legal system, there are many reasons why libel tourists find England a hospitable sanctuary to 
bring their grievances. First and foremost, England’s libel jurisprudence values reputation, while 
the United States values freedom of expression.  As will be discussed, this shifts the burden to 
the defendant to prove the truth of an allegedly defamatory statement. In addition, England’s 
rules of civil procedure, most importantly the law of personal jurisdiction, makes England a 
favorite destination for libel tourists.  
A.   Contrasting U.S. and English Libel Law 
 Freedom of expression is a fundamental element to democracy, but countries differ in 
how they value this basic right. In the United States, freedom of expression is accorded the 
highest value, and injury to one’s reputation, although regrettable, is sometimes an inevitable 
consequence of preserving this freedom.
47
 Conversely, in other countries, particularly England, 
damage to one’s reputation may trump the value of free expression. In these instances some 
defamation laws permit the courts to impose criminal sanctions on the accused.  
                                                          
44
 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347; Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 47 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis 
Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
45
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 1. 
46
 Id. 
47 Maly, supra note 29, at 889; see also discussion of First Amendment and New York Times v. Sullivan supra Part 
I. 
Marissa Gerny 
Legislative Journal Spring 2011 
 
9 
 
 In particular is the stark contrast between British and American jurisprudence. While 
both countries value freedom of expression, they balance the other interests – for instance 
reputation – differently and thus reach conflicting outcomes.48 Britain remains highly protective 
of an individual’s reputation and imposes much more rigid requirements on media defendants, 
while the United States understands that damage to reputation is an unavoidable consequence.
49
 
This dichotomy between the United States and Britain lies at the heart of the trouble of libel 
tourism and contributes directly to the uncertainty American authors and publishers face when 
deciding what to publish, and in what jurisdiction they may be forced to defend a defamation 
suit, thereby chilling their First Amendment rights.  
1.  English Libel Law 
England’s defamation law can be seen as a “mirror image”50 of the defamation law in the 
United States
51
, which explains how England became the “libel capital” and has attracted so 
many libel plaintiffs to bring their grievances to England.
52
 England’s defamation law retains 
many of the common law principles overturned in the United States by New York Times and its 
progeny.
53
 Thus, any alleged defamatory statement that adversely affects an individual’s 
reputation is prima facie defamatory.
54
 Specifically, the burden of proof shifts from the plaintiff 
to the defendant, where any alleged defamatory statement is presumed false and the defense has 
the burden to prove its truth.
55
 In addition, England does not impose any standard of fault, 
therefore, even if the defendant believed the alleged defamatory statement to be true, he can still 
                                                          
48 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 See discussion of United States libel jurisprudence supra Part I.  
52
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
53 Todd W. Moore, Untying our Hands: The Case for Uniform Personal Jurisdiction over “Libel Tourists,” 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 3207, 3212 (2009). 
54
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
55
 Moore, supra note 53, at 3212. 
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be found liable for defamation.
56
 The only burden placed on the plaintiff is to establish that the 
statement was directed to the plaintiff, was published by the defendant, and conveyed a 
defamatory meaning.
57
  
 Because the alleged statements are presumed false, the defendant’s only recourse is to 
demonstrate the truth of the statements or establish an exception in order to prevail over the 
charges.
58
 The English courts have acknowledged that there are some matters so important to the 
public interest that the defendant does not have to face the high burden of proving the truth of the 
underlying statement at issue.
59
 This “fair comment” exception may apply to statements made by 
the defendant on matters of public interest, and must be an opinion that the author could 
reasonably communicate based on facts, and made without malice.
60
 Although this exception can 
relieve a defendant from the burden of proving the truth of the underlying statement at issue, it 
gives far less protection than the laws in the United States.
61
  
 Another exception to England’s libel law is the absolute privilege exception that applies 
to comments made by members of Parliament.
62
 Members of the press can also claim this 
privilege “for fair and accurate reporting on judicial proceedings.”63 In addition, England’s libel 
laws recognize a qualified privilege when reporting on a government entity, reasoning that 
“government bodies should be open to criticism and these institutions should be unable to 
                                                          
56
 Id.  
57
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
58
 Maly, supra note 29, at 900. 
59
 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1999/45.html.  
60
 Maly, supra note 29, at 901. 
61 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 46 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
62
 Maly, supra note 29, at 901. 
63 Id.  
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prohibit speech.”64 Nevertheless, the application of this privilege is unclear, and is dependent on 
the circumstances of each case.
65
  
2.  Australian Libel Law 
While England remains the “libel capital” of the world and the main focus of libel 
tourism commentary, other countries also have similar defamation laws that attract libel tourists 
to these countries. Like the United States, Australia’s legal roots are derived from the English 
common law.
66
 However, where the United States deviated from England’s defamation law, 
Australia continued to follow its example.
67
 Thus, Australia holds reputation in higher regard 
than freedom of expression.
68
  
 In addition, Australia does not have any similar standard akin to the New York Times 
requirement that public figures must demonstrate that the defendant acted with actual malice.
69
 
Australian lawmakers support the lack of a different requirement for public figures by arguing 
that it would unjustly burden those in the public eye, simply because of their status.
70
 Therefore, 
like England, the alleged defamatory statement is presumed false, and the burden is on the 
defendant to prove its truth, in which there is no burden of fault.
71
 
 As an illustration, in Dow Jones v. Gutnick, Gutnick sued Dow Jones, publisher of the 
Wall Street Journal and Barron’s Magazine.72 An edition of Barron’s Online, found on the Wall 
Street Journal’s website contained an article titled “Unholy Gains” that allegedly defamed 
                                                          
64
 Id.; see also Reynolds, supra note 59.  
65 Maly, supra note 29, at 901-02. 
66
 Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 281. 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71
 Id.  
72 Dow Jones v. Gutnick, (2002) C.L.R. 575 (Austl.) P. 1.  
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Gutnick.
73
 In the suit, Dow Jones argued that Australia’s libel laws chilled U.S. notions of free 
speech and that the Australian court did not have jurisdiction over the matter.
74
 The High Court
75
 
responded by affirming the judgment, reasoning that since the Internet allowed for Australian 
subscriptions to the website, and that “common law adapts even to radically different 
environments,”76 then Dow Jones could rightfully be bound by the libel laws of Australia.  
B.   Contrasting U.S. and British Civil Procedure 
1.   Personal Jurisdiction 
As mentioned in the Introduction, a U.S. court cannot adjudicate a case without first 
obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
77
 This obstacle serves as the primary barrier 
in determining whether a U.S. court can adjudicate the enforceability of a foreign judgment.
78
 In 
order to acquire personal jurisdiction over the foreign party, the court must comply with the 
forum’s statutory requirements and the due process requirements of the Constitution.79 To satisfy 
these requirements, the court must apply either an applicable federal statute or a state long-arm 
statute.  A federal statute or the forum state’s long arm-statute indicates under what conditions a 
foreign party can be hauled into court in the particular forum.
80
 At the same time, the state’s 
basis for exercising personal jurisdiction must comply with the constitutional standard of 
minimum contacts.
81
  
                                                          
73
 Id. at P. 2.  
74 Sturtevant, supra note 3, at 282. 
75
 The High Court of Australia is the final court of appeal in Australia. 
http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Legalsystemandjustice_TheCourts 
76 Dow Jones, at P. 90.  
77 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
78 Moore, supra note 53, at 3222. 
79
 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) and (C). 
80 Moore, supra note 53, at 3222. 
81
 See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in 
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts.”). 
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 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restricts a court’s ability to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign party. Due process requires that the defendant have 
“certain minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the suit “does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”82 What constitutes minimum contacts has been an 
issue of debate for the Supreme Court over the years; however the enduring rationale is to protect 
a defendant from the inconvenience of traveling to a foreign forum to defend against the suit, and 
to make certain that states do not overextend their sovereign powers.
83
 However, the issue of 
sovereignty may play a greater part in international jurisdictional questions. In those situations a 
court may employ comity principles to refrain from meddling with another country’s fair 
exercise of jurisdiction.
84
  
 If a defendant cannot assert “continuous and systematic . . . contacts”85 with the forum 
state sufficient for personal jurisdiction, the defendant can also claim specific jurisdiction – 
jurisdiction based exclusively on the defendant’s contacts arising from the plaintiff’s claim.86 
However, it is important to note that it is the defendant’s contacts with the forum state that are 
relevant to the court’s inquiry concerning whether proper jurisdiction exists.87 The defendant’s 
act must “purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum 
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,” this is also known as the purposeful 
availment doctrine.
88
  
 Perhaps most troubling is how to reconcile the standard of minimum contacts and 
traditional geographic boundaries with the Internet, in which the Internet has created a world 
                                                          
82 Id. (quoting Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
83
 Moore, supra note 53, at 3223; see also World-wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
84 See discussion of comity and reciprocity infra Part IV. 
85
 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).  
86 Id. at 414 n.8. 
87
 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).  
88 Id. (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). 
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unrestricted by traditional geographic limits. Specific jurisdiction has been applied to the Internet 
context, whereby the defendant’s Internet activity must expressly target the forum state.89 The 
mere act of placing material on the Internet is not sufficient to sustain a finding of personal 
jurisdiction; rather, the defendant must have the requisite intent to target the readers of the forum 
state.
90
 In Young v. New Haven Advocate, a recent case that reviewed the purposeful availment 
doctrine’s application to the Internet, the Fourth Circuit looked at the advertisements and 
contents of the newspaper’s website, as well as the content of the article in question, to determine 
whether a Connecticut newspaper intended to target a Virginia audience.
91
 The court then 
concluded that since the advertisements and other content on the website, coupled with the local 
content of the specific article, were all aimed at a Connecticut audience, it was unreasonable for 
the newspaper to anticipate being hailed into court in Virginia, and therefore jurisdiction was not 
proper.
92
  
 Another difficult issue applies to defamation. Defamation is a non-physical tort, without 
specific geographical boundaries, in which the method of publication (such as investigating, 
writing, printing and disseminating) may occur in many different jurisdictions.
93
 Consequently, 
the jurisdictional issues do not neatly comport with the standard for minimum contacts.
94
 An 
illustration of this problem is found in Calder v. Jones.
95
  
In Calder, the National Enquirer, Inc., a Florida corporation with its principal place of 
business in Florida, published an allegedly defamatory article about Calder, a California 
                                                          
89
 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d. 256, 262 (4th Cir. 2002). 
90 Id. at 263. 
91 Id. at 263-64. 
92
 Id.  
93
 Maly, supra note 29, at 911. 
94 Id.  
95
 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
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resident.
96
 The National Enquirer publishes a national weekly newspaper, with a circulation of 
over 5 million, and approximately 600,000 of those copies were sold in California.
97
 The article 
in dispute alleged that Calder drank so heavily as to interfere with her professional 
responsibilities.
98
 In the suit, the National Enquirer argued that jurisdiction was not proper in 
California. Nonetheless the Court held that because “the brunt of the harm,” regarding both the 
emotional distress and injury to reputation claims, was suffered in California, jurisdiction was 
proper.
99
 In other words, jurisdiction was appropriate “based on the ‘effects’ of the National 
Enquirer’s Florida conduct in California.”100 Despite the fact that the Court clearly expanded the 
purposeful availment doctrine, it is questionable whether the effects test applies outside the scope 
of intentional torts.
101
  
 Like American courts, an English court will find jurisdiction proper if the defendant has 
caused a tort to occur inside the forum.
102
 However, where the United States courts require that 
the allegedly defamatory statements target the particular forum, the English courts do not. As a 
result, based on the multiple publication rule,
103
 the English courts have had no trouble finding 
jurisdiction even if the publication consisted of merely a few Internet hits or hard copies 
purchased online in England.
104
  
 Recently, the English courts have become more acquiescent to find jurisdiction based on 
the rationale that, in the Internet Age where geographic boundaries have greatly expanded, 
                                                          
96
 Id. at 785.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 789 n.9. 
99
 Id. at 789. 
100
 Id.  
101 Moore, supra note 53, at 3226. 
102
 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 262. 
103 See discussion of the multiple publication rule that every online hit constitutes a separate actionable tort discussed 
infra Part II B 3. 
104 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 262. 
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plaintiffs have a greater interest to protect their reputations.
105
 In King v. Lewis,
106
 the English 
Court of Appeal noted that it is “the publisher’s choice of a global medium” and thus “the 
Internet publisher’s very choice of a ubiquitous medium, at least suggests a robust approach to 
the question of forum: a global publisher should not be too fastidious as to the part of the globe 
where he is made a libel defendant.”107 In that case, the English court allowed Don King, a 
boxing promoter and Florida resident, to sue in England, a New York resident based on a 
libelous statement made on a California website.
108
 The court reasoned that since boxing was 
very popular in England, Don King had a reputation to protect there, and that the publisher’s 
choice to post the article on a global medium exposed himself to a global forum.
109
  
2.   Statute of Limitations 
 While not demanding of much explanation, the comparison between the statute of 
limitations in the United States and England is important. In the United States the statute of 
limitations begins to run from the first publication of the statement, albeit the publication may 
remain on sale or posted on the Internet.
110
 In England, however, the statute of limitations runs 
until the publication is no longer available in print format or online.
111
  
3.   Single vs. Multiple Publication Rule 
 Related to the statute of limitations issue is the disparity between the United States and 
England’s publication rule. The difference between the statute of limitations results from what 
the American and English courts consider a “publication.” Most U.S. states follow the “single 
                                                          
105
 Id.  
106 King v. Lewis, [2004] EWCA Civ. 1329, available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2004/1329.html.  
107
 Id. at P. 31. 
108 Id. at PP. 2-4. 
109
 Id. at PP. 13, 27-32. 
110
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 48 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
111
 Id.  
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publication rule,” which states that “any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or 
television broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate communication, is a 
single publication,” and can give rise to only one action for defamation.112 As a result, a plaintiff 
can only bring one action, even if the harm was suffered in numerous jurisdictions.
113
 The courts 
adopted this rule to protect publishers from facing lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions and the 
“undue harassment” that may result because of mass publications.114 The single publication rule 
also applies to the Internet context. Thus, the statute of limitations on the article begins to run 
when it is first published on the website.
115
  
 England adheres to the “multiple publication rule,” which states that every publication of 
the disputed material gives rise to an actionable tort, even if the statement appears in multiple 
jurisdictions throughout the world.
116
 This rule was announced in 1849 in The Duke of 
Brunswick v. Harmer,
117
 in which the court held that a purchase of a seventeen-year old back 
issue of a newspaper constituted a new “publication” and therefore gave rise to an actionable 
tort, regardless of the original publication date.
118
 As a result of this archaic rule, a single Internet 
hit will constitute a publication for libel purposes.
119
 However, due to the absurdity of this result, 
the Ministry of Justice sought a review of the rule, and in March 2010 found that it was 
appropriate to introduce a single publication rule, while leaving discretion to extend the time 
                                                          
112
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(3) (1977); see definition of publication supra note 4. 
113 § 577A(4)(b). 
114
 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 260. 
115 Sack, Sack on Defamation § 7.2; see e.g. Firth v. State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 465-66 (N.Y. 2002) (holding that a libel 
claim barred by New York’s one-year statute of limitations where the disputed speech was initially posted on the 
Internet more than a year before plaintiff filed suit). 
116
 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 260-61. 
117 The Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer, (1849) 117 Eng. Rep. 175 (Q.B.) 
118
 Id. at 176-77. 
119 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 261. 
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period if necessary.
120
 The detailed provisions necessary to administer the operation of the single 
publication rule are currently under consideration.
121
 
4.   Fee Shifting 
Fee shifting rules provide a considerable incentive for libel plaintiffs to bring suit in 
England. In the United States each party to the litigation pays their own attorney’s fees, unless 
specific authority granted by statute or contract allows for the collection of those fees.
122
 The 
prevailing party does not collect attorney’s fees unless authorized by law.123  
 On the other hand, under fee shifting in England the losing party bears all of the costs 
related to the litigation.
124
 This is significant in the libel context because the defendant bears the 
burden of proof, and the likelihood of a plaintiff victory is substantial. Furthermore, the cost of 
litigation in England can run into the millions because most libel cases require multiple 
attorneys.
125
  
 
 
5.  Forum Non Conveniens  
 One possible solution for a media defendant facing a defamation suit in England is to 
argue that the suit should be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. This legal doctrine 
allows for dismissal where personal jurisdiction is proper, but the practicalities of facing 
litigation in the forum places an undue burden on the defendant and thus the case should be 
                                                          
120 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET: THE MULTIPLE PUBLICATION RULE (2010), available 
at http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/defamation-internet-consultation-paper.htm. 
121 Id.  
122
 FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d). 
123
 Id.  
124
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 49 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
125 Id.; see also Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 259. 
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transferred to a more convenient court.
126
 However, in effect, this procedural device does little to 
restrain the reach of English courts, because it is dependent on the discretion of the judge, and 
British judges view their jurisdiction broadly.
127
 British courts justify jurisdiction based on the 
argument that the tort occurred there, even when the connection to England is tenuous.
128
 They 
have also indicated that because the action would most likely not “survive” in the United States, 
“there would seem little point in addressing how much more convenient [a U.S. forum] would 
be.”129  
III.  PREVALENCE AND CHILLING EFFECTS OF LIBEL TOURISM ON FIRST 
AMENDMENT PROTECTED SPEECH 
 
 While the comparison of libel laws and jurisdictional issues between the United States 
and England depict an undoubtedly sharp divergence in their approaches to defamation, and thus 
reveals why England is a much more attractive venue to bring a defamation suit, it is important 
to ascertain just how prevalent this “legal loophole” is and who are its victims. Is the intentional 
and strategic decision to forum shop and file suit outside the United States, in actuality, a 
problem to be remedied by federal legislation, or does Ehrenfeld stand out as an outlier, an 
atypical case with an extreme set of facts?  
 A foreign defamation judgment may have wide-ranging implications. Arguably, the one 
most concerning and troubling for media defendants is its ability to chill their protected First 
Amendment free speech rights. Libel tourism’s chilling effect cuts off the free flow of 
information that should reach the public, and instead silences authors and journalists.
130
 
                                                          
126
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 21 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP); see 
generally Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
127
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 21(written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
128
 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 264; see also Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 832 (only 23 copies sold in UK but 
still sustained jurisdiction because the tort occurred there). 
129
 King, at P. 18. 
130
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 23 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
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Journalists are often compelled to self-censor their speech to ensure that their statements not only 
conform to the standards of the First Amendment, but also that they satisfy the more “stifling 
strictures of English libel law.”131 Although it is difficult to evaluate if and how libel tourism 
may chill free expression because it is impossible to catalogue what has been refrained from 
being published, testimony from prominent media lawyers indicates just how far reaching the 
chilling effect is, particularly on writings about controversial international subjects.
132
  
Media lawyers, such as Bruce D. Brown, partner at Baker & Hostetler, LLC, who review 
their clients’ material before it is published, have firsthand knowledge of how libel tourism has 
altered the “legal landscape.”133 For example, more than a decade ago, Mr. Brown’s colleagues 
represented journalist Craig Unger in a libel suit filed by Robert McFarlane against Esquire 
magazine.
134
 The alleged defamatory statement concerned an article entitled “October Sunrise,” 
which discussed efforts to negotiate the release of the American hostages in Iran.
135
 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found in Mr. Unger’s favor, indicating that there was no 
evidence to suggest the material in the article was false. However, approximately a decade later, 
Mr. Unger’s British publisher canceled their plans to bring to England his book, House of Bush, 
House of Saud: The Secret Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties, a 
U.S. bestseller.
136
 A potential suit by the members of the Saudi Royal Family prevented the 
publication of Mr. Unger’s book even though it was cleared for publication and was published in 
the United States.
137
   
                                                          
131
 Id.  
132
 Id.  
133
 Id. 
134
 Id. at n. 24; see also McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine, 74 F.3d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
135
 Id.  
136 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 24 (written statement by Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP). 
137
 Id. at n. 56 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP). 
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As a further illustration, Laura Handman, partner at Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP 
testified that U.S. publishers her firm represents repeatedly receive letters on behalf of U.S. 
celebrities and businessmen from both U.S. and British law firms threatening lawsuits in 
England if the allegedly defamatory statements are published.
138
 If the publication has already 
been published, U.S. publishers are eager to settle the claims because of the high economic risk, 
and the knowledge that the claim will likely succeed in England.
139
 As a result, while media 
lawyers may feel reassured that their clients are well protected by the First Amendment in the 
United States they must also counsel their clients about the risks of their work being exposed in 
England and the high probability for eventual litigation. 
Furthermore, Dr. Ehrenfeld experienced firsthand the chilling effects the English 
judgment against her had on her U.S. protected free speech rights. She testified that she had 
many “sleepless nights” worried that Mahfouz would come to New York to enforce the English 
judgment against her.
140
 Although he never attempted to enforce the judgment in the United 
States, the potential that he would “left it hanging over [her] head like a sword of Damocles,” 
thereby exacerbating the chilling effect.
141
 In addition, Ehrenfeld testified that the English 
judgment affected her ability to publish, and to travel to England, lest she be arrested to enforce 
the judgment against her.
142
 Those who once “courted” her now refuse to publish her. 143 
Ehrenfeld was not Mahfouz’s only victim; he has obtained settlements in nearly forty cases, and 
                                                          
138
 Id.  
139
 Id. 
140
 Id. at n. 12 (testimony of Rachel Ehrenfeld). 
141
 Id.  
142
 Id.; see discussion of enforcement of judgments infra Part IV. 
143 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 14 (written statement by Rachel Ehrenfeld). 
Marissa Gerny 
Legislative Journal Spring 2011 
 
22 
 
boasts about his conquests on his website, thereby silencing and intimidating any would-be 
critics of him.
144
  
IV.  PRINCIPLES OF COMITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN DEFAMATION 
JUDGMENTS 
  
While U.S. states enforce the judgments of other states under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the Constitution, there is no such requirement for foreign money judgments, and there 
is no federal law that mandates recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United 
States.
 145
 In addition, the United States is not a party to any treaties or international agreements 
dealing with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, although Congress does 
have the authority to enact legislation that would prohibit the enforcement of foreign judgments 
if those judgments were found to be inconsistent with the First Amendment.
146
  
Curiously, the enforcement and recognition of foreign country judgments has largely 
been left to the states.
147
 Many, but not all, states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act, however the adoptions are not consistent. For example, some states 
have incorporated the requirement of reciprocity – the requirement that a foreign judgment will 
be recognized and enforced in the United States so long as a U.S. judgment would be enforced in 
a foreign country under similar circumstances.
148
 Other states do not have this requirement; the 
adoption of the Uniform Act is left to the discretion of the states, and as a result, a foreign 
                                                          
144
 Id.; Bin Mahfouz posts on his website how often he brings defamation suits against various American authors. 
http://www.binmahfouz.info/en_index.html. 
145 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 181-82 (1895).  
146
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 52 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP) 
(indicating that the Hague Convention on Choice Agreements would require Convention signatories to recognize 
judgments rendered by a court in another signatory country, and would apply to defamation judgments, but the 
United States has not yet ratified the Convention).  
147
 Id. at n. 62 (written statement by Linda J. Silberman, Professor, New York University School of Law). 
148
 Id.  
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judgment may be enforced in one state, but not in another.
149
 In sum, there is no uniform 
American law governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
At the same time, the United States may enforce a foreign judgment despite the fact there 
is no law mandating enforcement. The underlying rationale of recognizing and enforcing foreign 
judgments against U.S. parties is the general principle that, in order to be enforced in the United 
States, the judgment must have been achieved through a fair and impartial process.
150
 This 
principle has been developed by the notion of comity – “the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due 
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens.”151 In 
other words, the doctrine of comity is meant to foster friendly international relations.
152
 On the 
other hand, a foreign judgment may be refused recognition if the judgment or cause of action is 
repugnant to the public policy of the United States or the state where recognition is wanted.
153
 In 
particular, U.S. courts have refused to recognize foreign defamation judgments when the 
enforcement would encroach on traditional First Amendment rights, and is therefore repugnant 
to public policy.
154
  
In Bachchan v. India Abroad, a Swedish daily newspaper reported that Swiss authorities 
had frozen the bank account of Indian national Ajitabh Bachchan.
155
 A small New York 
                                                          
149
 Id. at n. 63. 
150 Moore, supra note 53, at 3217. 
151
 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163-64.  
152
 Id. at 165.  
153 See e.g. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(3) (1962) (“a foreign judgment need not 
be recognized if [the cause of action] [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public 
policy of this state”); see also UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(3) (2005) (“a court of 
this state need not recognize a foreign-country judgment if the foreign-country judgment or the [cause of action] 
[claim for relief] on which the foreign-country judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state or of 
the United States.”). 
154
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 64 (written statement by Linda J. Silberman, Professor, New York University School 
of Law). 
155 Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).  
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publication, India Abroad, transmitted the story to India and printed and distributed the story in 
England and New York. Bachchan, a well-known public figure in India and around the world, 
sued both the Swedish newspaper and India Abroad for libel in England.
156
 Even though the 
primary distribution occurred overwhelmingly in the United States, and only 1,000 copies were 
distributed in England, a judgment was entered against India Abroad, where it was held strictly 
liable for £40,000 for “publishing a story based on another paper’s ‘unwitting’ error.”157  
Although Bachchan was victorious in England, he had less good fortune in the United 
States. After his win in England, Bachchan instituted a proceeding in New York to enforce the 
English judgment against India Abroad.
158
 The court declined to enforce the judgment on public 
policy grounds, stating that the First Amendment “would be seriously jeopardized by entry of a 
foreign libel judgment[] pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but considered 
antithetical to the protections afforded to the press by the U.S. Constitution.”159  
The Maryland high court reached the analogous conclusion that a foreign libel judgment 
contravened the First Amendment and precluded recognition of the judgment. In Telnikoff v. 
Matusevitch, Telnikoff, an English citizen, complained in an op-ed column published in 
London’s Daily Telegraph, that the BBC’s Russian Service employed too many “Russian-
speaking national minorities” but not enough of “those who associate themselves ethnically, 
spiritually or religiously with the Russian people.” 160  Matusevitch, a Maryland resident, 
responded with an angry letter also published in the Telegraph. The letter protested what he 
considered Telnikoff as advocating for a “switch from professional testing to a blood test” and 
                                                          
156
 Id. 
157
 Id. at 662; Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 53 (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright 
Tremaine, LLP). 
158
 Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662. 
159
 Id. at 684. 
160
 Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 566 (1997). 
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was “stressing his racialist recipe by claiming that no matter how high the standards and integrity 
‘of ethnically alien’ people Russian staff might be, they should be dismissed.”161 In the United 
States, the letter would have been considered the “heated hyperbole uttered in the course of 
public debate that is protected by the First Amendment in this country as non-actionable 
opinion.”162 However, the English jury concluded otherwise, and found that the letter expressed 
the “fact” that Telnikoff was a racialist, and awarded Telnikoff £240,000.163  
Telnikoff then sought to enforce the judgment in the United States. The United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment for Matusevitch, concluding that the 
English libel judgment was repugnant to the public policy of the state of Maryland and the 
United States.
164
 After Telnikoff appealed the district court’s decision, the D.C. Circuit certified 
a question to Maryland’s highest court, the question whether Telnikoff’s foreign judgment was 
repugnant to the public policy of Maryland.
165
 The Maryland Court of Appeals answered in the 
affirmative, stating “at the heart of the First Amendment . . . is the recognition of the 
fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and 
concern . . . the importance of that free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public concern 
precludes Maryland recognition of Telnikoff’s English libel judgment.”166  
                                                          
161
 Id. 
162
 Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 54 (2009) (written statement by Laura Handman, Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine, 
LLP). 
163 Telnikoff, 347 Md. At 571. 
164
 Id. at 572. 
165
 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the cause of action underlying the English 
libel judgment was “repugnant to the public policy of the State within the meaning of Maryland’s Uniform Foreign-
Money Judgments Recognition Act” and that “recognition of the foreign judgment under principles of comity would 
be repugnant to the public policies of the State of Maryland and the United States.” Alternatively, the District Court 
held that recognition and enforcement would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Telnikoff appealed to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which certified the question of whether the English 
judgment was repugnant to the public policy of the state of Maryland. Id. at 572-73. 
166
 Id. at 602. 
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Aside from the public policy defense, a party may also sue for declaratory relief, pursuant 
to the Declaratory Judgment Act,
167
 that a foreign judgment is unenforceable in a U.S. court. The 
court will “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party” and the judgment 
for her “shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as 
such.”168 However, this provision does not provide for any further jurisdictional powers upon 
U.S. courts, thus personal jurisdiction remains a complex threshold matter.  
In Bachchan and Telnikoff, the states of New York and Maryland concluded that 
recognition of foreign libel judgments in the United States impaired the public policy of New 
York and Maryland, as well as of the United States.  However, a more recent effort to declare a 
foreign libel judgment unenforceable in the United States proved unsuccessful. The New York 
Court of Appeals in Ehrenfeld, while acknowledging the problem of libel tourism, determined 
that Mahfouz’s contact with New York could not establish a proper basis for jurisdiction, and 
therefore Ehrenfeld’s argument to expand New York’s long-arm statute must be directed to the 
legislature.
169
  
 
V.  RESPONSES TO LIBEL TOURISM 
 It was evident from the Ehrenfeld decision that to combat the problems of libel tourism 
effectively, a legislative response was crucial. The decision prompted a national public outcry 
and united free speech advocates to fight on Ehrenfeld’s behalf.170 New York responded with the 
                                                          
167
 See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006). 
168
 Id. 
169
 Ehrenfeld, 881 N.E.2d at 830; see discussion of state’s responses infra Part V; see also discussion of personal 
jurisdiction supra Part II B 1.  
170
 Adam Cohen, ‘Libel Tourism’: When Freedom of Speech Takes a Holiday, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008 available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/opinion/15mon4.html.  
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Libel Terrorism Protection Act
171
 and other states were quick to follow with similar versions of 
their own.
172
 In August 2010, the SPEECH Act, a federal answer to libel tourism was signed into 
law by President Barack Obama.
173
 
A. States’ Responses 
 Motivated by the Ehrenfeld decision, the New York legislature responded by enacting the 
Libel Terrorism Protection Act (often dubbed “Rachel’s Law”) and amending their jurisdictional 
statute.
174
 First, the Act amended New York’s version of their Uniform Act and provided that a 
defamation judgment rendered outside the United States will not be enforced in New York courts 
unless the court in New York concludes that the defamation law applied by the foreign court 
provides “at least as much protection for freedom of speech and press . . . as would be provided 
by both the United States and New York Constitutions.”175 Since virtually no other jurisdiction 
provides as high a level of protection for speech as the United States, the Act applies to disable 
almost every foreign defamation judgment.
176
  
Second, the Act amended New York’s long-arm statute by attaching jurisdiction to 
foreign defendants, so long as the allegedly defamatory publication was published in New York, 
the domestic plaintiff is a resident of New York and is amenable to jurisdiction in New York or 
may have to take action in New York to comply with the judgment.
177
 This extension of 
jurisdiction in effect provides that no territorial nexus between the foreign defendant and the 
                                                          
171
 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2009). 
172
 For example Illinois passed a similar version of the New York Act. 735 ILCS 5/12-621(b)(7) (2009). 
173 Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 
Stat. 2380 (2010) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05) (2010)). 
174
 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8) (McKinney 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a) (McKinney 2009). 
175 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5304(b)(8). 
176
 Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 36, at 276. 
177 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a). 
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domestic plaintiff is required.  As a result, a domestic plaintiff can bring an action for declaratory 
relief with much greater ease and can seek to preempt an enforcement suit. 
 Soon after, Illinois followed suit. Taking the New York Bill as a model, Illinois amended 
its version of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. The Illinois law extended 
long-arm jurisdiction over libel tourists, and provided grounds for non-enforcement of foreign 
defamation judgments.
178
  
B. Federal Response 
 Upon the urging of media lawyers, legislators, legal commentators, and other lobbying 
groups, the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act 
or “SPEECH Act” was enacted and signed into law by the President on August 10, 2010.179 The 
purpose is to prohibit recognition and enforcement of foreign defamation judgments against 
United States authors and publishers, as well as certain foreign judgments against the providers 
of interactive computer services, in other words, to prevent libel tourism. The SPEECH Act 
operates as both “a shield and a sword” to protect United States citizens from foreign defamation 
judgments.
180
 The “shield” feature in the law permits an American defendant to remain passive, 
given that a foreign defamation judgment cannot be enforced in the United States unless the 
judgment holder meets the requirements of the SPEECH Act.  It also acts as a “sword,” because 
it creates a cause of action for declaratory relief in federal court to challenge the enforceability of 
the foreign defamation judgment. 
 The shield aspect of the SPEECH Act sets forth a three-pronged approach. In an action to 
enforce the foreign judgment, the person seeking to enforce the judgment must first prove that 
                                                          
178
 735 ILCS 5/12-621(b)(7) (2009); 735 ILCS 5/2-209(b)(5) (2009). 
179
 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05. 
180 Jennifer A. Mansfield, New Federal Law Protects Authors, Interactive Computer Services from Foreign 
Defamation Judgments, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (Sept. 22, 2010) available at 
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the foreign court’s application of their defamation law provided at least as much protection as the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the constitution and law of the state 
where the domestic court resides; or that the American defendant would have been liable anyway 
under the state’s libel law. 181  Second, where applicable, the defendant must prove that the 
foreign defamation judgment is consistent with section 230 of the Communications Act of 
1934.
182
 Finally, the foreign defendant must prove that the foreign court’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the media defendant comported with the U.S. Constitution’s due process 
requirements.
183
 If a foreign defendant cannot meet these requirements, the state or federal court 
cannot recognize or enforce the foreign defamation judgment.
184
  
 The SPEECH Act applies to both state and federal courts; however, a defendant has the 
discretion to remove the case to federal court with no amount in controversy requirement.
185
 The 
law also provides an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the party opposing recognition or 
enforcement of the foreign defamation judgment.
186
 This provision is one-sided, and only 
provides attorneys’ fees to the party opposing enforcement.187  
 The SPEECH Act can also act as a sword.
188
 It provides that any U.S. person may bring 
an action in federal court for a declaratory judgment that the foreign defamation judgment is 
repugnant to the U.S. Constitution (the First Amendment) or the laws of the United States.
189
 
Additionally, this provision can also serve as a “double-edged sword,”190  in which the law 
                                                          
181
 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A) and (B). 
182
 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (c); Section 230 provides immunity from liability for providers and users of an interactive 
computer service who publish information by third parties. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230.  
183 28 U.S.C. § 4102 (b). 
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187
 Id. 
188
 Mansfield, supra note 180. 
189
 28 U.S.C. § 4104(a)(1). 
190
 Mansfield, supra note 180. 
Marissa Gerny 
Legislative Journal Spring 2011 
 
30 
 
provides for nationwide service of process, thus making it easier to obtain personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign defendant.
191
 On the other side, though, is the requirement that the domestic 
plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate the foreign defamation law repugnant.
192
 In addition, it 
appears that the attorneys’ fees provision only applies in an action “to enforce a foreign 
judgment for defamation,” not for declaratory judgments.193 Under the Act, declaratory judgment 
actions seek to declare the foreign defamation judgment invalid, not to enforce it, therefore it 
seems to only apply when the media defendant “acts solely in a defensive manner.”194  
VI. IMPACT OF THE SPEECH ACT 
 
 The SPEECH Act is a national response to libel tourism. The issues and illustrations 
described earlier indicate that libel tourism is a global problem in need of a national remedy. 
However, in order to continue to foster friendly international relations, and remain respectful of 
other countries’ sovereignty, federal legislation needs to carefully balance the interest of 
protecting American citizens’ First Amendment free speech rights on the one hand, while also 
being mindful to not go too far into another country’s jurisdiction. The SPEECH Act provides 
this remedy. Nevertheless, it is uncertain whether the SPEECH Act will have the intended effect, 
because the balance provides gaps whereby a U.S. person facing litigation abroad may not have 
the SPEECH Act as protection.  Moreover, the problem of libel tourism is international in scope, 
thus the most effective solution must be international as well.
195
 Despite this, the SPEECH Act 
provides a national solution to libel tourism, and reaches as far as permitted by the U.S. 
Constitution. 
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A.  Libel Perspective 
 One troubling feature of the SPEECH Act is that it does not define who specifically a 
libel tourist is.
196
 However, in Congress’ findings it is clear that the SPEECH Act expressly 
refers to the problem of persons “obstructing the free expression rights of United States authors 
and publishers.”197 In addition, the cause of action for declaratory relief directly references “any 
United States person against whom a foreign judgment is entered.”198 Thus it is evident that the 
SPEECH Act is limited to those libel plaintiffs who initiate litigation abroad against United 
States persons for the purpose of capitalizing on the foreign country’s plaintiff friendly libel 
laws. As an illustration, the SPEECH Act would not apply to an Englishman who has assets in 
the United States, and is sued by another Englishman in England.
199
 Because the SPEECH Act 
directly references United States persons, the Englishman faced with a lawsuit in England is not 
a United States person as defined by the SPEECH Act.
200
 
 Another problem also arises. What if the defamation suit is based on a meritorious claim 
that the libel plaintiff was sincerely defamed by an American person or publication? For 
example, what if an American is sued in England for passing out leaflets in Piccadilly Circus that 
allegedly defamed an English person? Can this United States person come to the United States 
                                                          
196
 The SPEECH Act only references in its findings that “some persons are obstructing the free expression rights of 
United States authors and publishers . . . by seeking out foreign jurisdictions that do not provide the full extent of 
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author or publisher in that foreign jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05. 
197
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against a fellow Englishman who has assets in the United States needed to satisfy the judgment). 
200
 “The term ‘United States person’ means— 
 (A) a United States citizen’ 
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(C) an alien lawfully residing in the United States at the time that the speech that is the subject of the 
foreign defamation action was researched, prepared, or disseminated; or 
(D) a business entity incorporated in, or with its primary location or place of operation in, the United 
States.” 
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and seek declaratory relief that the foreign judgment is unenforceable? The answer must be no. 
Based on the spirit and language of the SPEECH Act it is evident that Congress was referring to 
those libel plaintiffs who purposely seek out foreign countries for their libel laws and when the 
allegedly defamatory statements have little or no connection to the forum where litigation is 
initiated.
201
 The jurisdictional and declaratory relief provisions of the SPEECH Act provides a 
means to distinguish between colorable claims that are of legitimate interest to foreign courts and 
those that are merely abusive.  
Most significantly, the SPEECH Act will serve as a solution to the chilling effect that 
libel tourism has had on so many American publishers and journalists. If an American finds him 
or herself in the position of defending a defamation suit abroad, he or she can default on the suit 
and seek declaratory relief in the United States.
202
 Since the United States’ libel laws favor 
freedom of expression rather than damage to reputation, it is likely that a U.S. court will find that 
the foreign court’s application of their defamation law does not comport with the First 
Amendment, especially if the defamation suit is initiated in England.
203
  
 In addition, the SPEECH Act may have a deterrent effect on libel tourists. If the libel 
plaintiff is interested in seeking a money judgment from a media defendant who does not have 
assets in the foreign forum, the libel tourist may reconsider the prospects of filing a defamation 
suit. If the suit is filed in England, it is highly likely the libel plaintiff will be victorious, but if 
the judgment cannot be enforced in the United States, then the foreign judgment will effectively 
be rendered meaningless. Without assets in the country the libel plaintiff can collect from, the 
                                                          
201
 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05 (Congress’ findings states that “some persons are obstructing the free expression rights of 
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defamation suit is of little value.
204
 Furthermore, if the libel tourist chooses to enforce the foreign 
judgment before a declaratory judgment is sought by the media defendant, and the libel tourist 
loses, he will be subject to reasonable attorneys’ fees.205 Accordingly, the libel tourist has much 
to lose with the enactment of the SPEECH Act, and it can therefore be a very costly endeavor to 
protect one’s reputation.  
 On the other hand, for wealthy executives like Bin Mahfouz, who often bring these 
suits,
206
 seeking enforcement of the judgment is of no great importance. Rather, these libel 
tourists initiate litigation to silence American authors and journalists. The defamation suit acts as 
an intimidation tool to threaten Americans from publishing writings on subjects of international 
concern, specifically on matters of terrorism.
207
 As a result, the SPEECH Act may provide little 
deterrent effect for these particular libel tourists. However, as discussed above, by seeking a 
declaratory judgment, the chilling effects is greatly diminished because American authors and 
journalists will feel less threatened and intimidated by foreign litigation and therefore continue to 
report on matters of international concern.  
B.  Civil Procedure Perspective 
 The SPEECH Act grants a national service of process provision for actions seeking 
declaratory relief in federal court. This provision will make it easier to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.  In other words, personal jurisdiction will be proper so long 
as the due process minimum contacts requirement is satisfied or specific jurisdiction is 
                                                          
204
 On the other hand, for example, Rachel Ehrenfeld cannot travel to the UK without running the risk of being 
arrested to enforce Mahfouz’s judgment against her. Hearing, supra note 1, at n. 14 (prepared statement of Rachel 
Ehrenfeld). 
205
 28 U.S.C. § 4105. 
206
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obtained.
208
  The nationwide service of process provision will allow a court to sustain 
jurisdiction, provided that the foreign defendant has some connection to the United States; the 
contacts do not have to be found in a particular forum, but rather the United States as a whole.
209
 
Courts have repeatedly held that when a federal statute contains a national service of process 
provision the provision will bestow personal jurisdiction in any federal district court on any 
defendant with minimum contacts to the United States.
210
 This provision ensures that a libel 
tourist, who may do occasional business throughout the United States, but not enough to satisfy a 
minimum contacts test in a particular jurisdiction, will still be amenable to suit in a federal court.  
 However, the SPEECH Act does not assure that personal jurisdiction will be found in all 
cases. The constitutional requirements must still be satisfied. If the foreign defendant has no 
contacts sufficient to obtain jurisdiction, the U.S. court will have to dismiss the case for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, and thus the declaratory judgment cause of action will be of little assistance 
to the domestic plaintiff. Such an outcome would be unfortunate, but it comports with due 
process.  
New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act extended New York’s long-arm statute to 
sustain personal jurisdiction over any person who obtains a foreign defamation judgment against 
a resident of New York or a person amenable to jurisdiction there, regardless of the foreign 
defendant’s ties to the state.211 Although the law has not been challenged, many critics argue that 
the jurisdictional provision violates long-standing principles of due process.
212
 The Advisory 
Committee on Civil Practice has questioned the constitutionality of the provision, and predicted 
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that it would face court challenges.
213
 So while the New York law makes obtaining jurisdiction 
dramatically easier, it is most likely unconstitutional. As a result, the SPEECH Act’s jurisdiction 
provision is the greatest constitutional measure that can be taken, short of an international 
solution.  
C.  Comity and Reciprocity 
 While there are more direct ways to prevent a U.S. author or publisher from defending a 
suit in a foreign court, for example, through injunctive relief, this would cause great intrusion 
into the affairs of the foreign tribunal. The SPEECH Act does not go this far. It does not enjoin 
the foreign court proceedings, but does allow for lack of jurisdiction as an additional ground for 
non-enforcement and a cause of action for declaratory relief. In this way the SPEECH Act both 
respects the sovereignty of other countries, while also protecting Americans’ First Amendment 
rights.
214
 The doctrine of comity allows a U.S. court to enforce a foreign judgment so long as it 
was rendered by a fair and impartial process.
215
 Similarly, a U.S. court can refuse enforcement of 
a foreign judgment if the laws of the foreign court do not comport with the laws and Constitution 
of the United States on grounds of public policy. These principles are not affected by the 
SPEECH Act. The law does not automatically render a foreign defamation judgment 
unenforceable. Rather, the party seeking enforcement, or the party seeking declaratory relief, 
must prove that the foreign court’s defamation law offends the principles of the First 
Amendment.
216
  
 A declaration by a U.S. court that a foreign judgment is repugnant to the First 
Amendment will give United States publishers a mechanism and the comfort necessary to 
                                                          
213
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continue to publish their material, regardless of a contrary verdict in England. For example, Bin 
Mahfouz would not have been able to deter Rachel Ehrenfeld from publishing similar allegations 
or material. Ehrenfeld does not have to wait for Mahfouz to come to the United States to enforce 
his judgment against her, but rather empowers Ehrenfeld to respond proactively.  
D.  Is the SPEECH Act Necessary? 
 The problems posed by libel tourism make clear that the Ehrenfeld decision is not just an 
atypical case, and does not stand as an outlier. Instead, libel tourism is a major threat to 
American authors and publishers and to the First Amendment in general. As the many 
illustrations and cases indicate, the readiness of British libel law judges to generously extend the 
jurisdiction of their courts allows foreign claimants to bring suit even when the allegedly 
defamatory statement has a tenuous connection to the United Kingdom.
217
 Although libel 
tourism does threaten the First Amendment, the need for a federal response is debatable. The tide 
seems to be turning in England, as recent commentary suggests that England’s archaic libel 
jurisprudence may be changing. In addition, other remedies for libel tourism exist. Such 
remedies include a public policy argument and a proposed federal statute that would create a 
uniform national rule for enforcement of foreign country judgments not limited to the concern of 
libel tourism.  
1.  England’s Reaction to Libel Tourism 
 Even though libel tourism is a problem of international concern, it could arguably be 
stated that with the existing law and various doctrines already in place, the SPEECH Act is 
unnecessary legislation. To begin with, there is reason to believe that England, the libel capital, 
is in the process of amending their defamation laws.  An article from the Economist.com hinted 
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that concerns are being expressed in Britain regarding their defamation law.
218
 Denis MacShane, 
a senior Labour MP, stated in a debate in the House of Commons, that libel tourism is “an 
international scandal” and “a major assault on freedom of information.”219 In addition, the article 
stated that a parliamentary committee dealing with the media has received a large number of 
submissions from people worried about libel tourism.
220
 
 Furthermore, as discussed previously, British defamation case law provides for 
exceptions to the traditional plaintiff-friendly standards. In particular, in Jameel v. Wall Street 
Journal, the British court recognized a defense to libel since the allegedly defamatory article 
dealt with a matter of genuine public interest.
221
 In addition, the disputed statement made a 
proper contribution to the whole force of the publication, the publisher acted reasonably and 
fairly in obtaining the material, and the disputed article was of important public interest.
222
 The 
defense in Jameel is also known as the “responsible journalism” exception, in which there is a 
privilege for defendants who act responsibly in publishing the disputed material.
223
 
 As a result, if Britain changes their defamation law, the SPEECH Act will be deemed 
unnecessary for a majority of libel tourism suits. However, English defamation law is deep 
rooted, and thus highly unlikely to reach the high level of protection one finds in the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution in the near future. On the other hand, with the 
passage of the SPEECH Act, the British legislature and courts may become more compelled to 
amend their defamation laws in the direction of First Amendment protection of the press. In 
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other words, if American publishers and journalists choose not to publish in England out of fear 
of a defamation suit, there will be more incentive to amend British defamation law.
224
 
2.  Redundancy 
 A related issue to the comity and reciprocity concerns is one of redundancy. U.S. courts 
have already refused to enforce foreign defamation judgments. As discussed previously, in 
Bachchan and Telnikoff, the courts, on grounds of public policy, refused to enforce the British 
libel judgments, concluding that the foreign judgments were repugnant to the First Amendment. 
With these cases as precedent, other U.S. courts may decide that they have the authority to refuse 
enforcement, without the protection of the SPEECH Act.  
 In addition, there is a proposed federal statute creating a uniform national rule for 
enforcement of foreign country judgments that has been adopted by the American Law Institute 
(ALI).
225
 The recommended legislation authorizes negotiation of agreements with foreign 
countries, regarding reciprocal enforcement of each other’s judgments.226 The legislation also 
offers incentives to foreign countries and their courts to enforce the judgments from the United 
States.
227
 
 On the other hand, the SPEECH Act provides a visible, targeted response to the chilling 
effects of libel tourism. While U.S. courts have refused enforcement of foreign defamation 
judgments, there is no federal law mandating the recognition or refusal. The Uniform Foreign 
Money Judgments Recognition Act has been adopted at the state level, but not all states have 
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adopted it, and those who have, have adopted inconsistent versions.
228
 Therefore, one state may 
refuse enforcement as repugnant to the public policy of the state; another state may recognize the 
foreign judgment. In order for an American author or journalist to be fully protected and certain 
that they will be protected by the laws of the United States, the federal response was necessary. 
With the enactment of the SPEECH Act, there is little doubt that all American authors and 
publishers are bound by the principles set forth in the First Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
 The SPEECH Act provides a national response to the practice of libel tourism. Although 
the Act will not deter all foreign defamation litigation abroad, it is a step in the right direction. 
The gaps that are found in the legislation are constitutionally inevitable. Short of an international 
solution, the SPEECH Act reaches as far as constitutionally permissible. In addition, the 
SPEECH Act reminds United States citizens of America’s commitment that “debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”229 The SPEECH Act stands as a forceful 
barrier for those who wish to circumvent the First Amendment and undo the free speech 
protections that hold an acclaimed place in American society. 
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